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Jun 2, 201929 min read

Updated: Oct 15, 2019

Perjury

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Perjury is the word used for a person that tells a lie while they are under oath (in a courtroom). Committing perjury is against the law, and can be punished with a jail or prison sentence.

Perjury is a serious crime because it might be used to take away the power of a court, which can lead to punishment for the wrong person. In the United States, perjury is a federal offense, and it can be punished by five years in prison. However, in California, a person who commits perjury can get the death penalty if the perjury led to a wrongful execution.

The rules of perjury also apply when a person says or does something under penalty of perjury, even if he or she never swore an oath. One example is the United States' income tax return, where people have to sign as true and correct under penalty of perjury. A person can be punished by three years in prison if he or she lies on the tax return.

A statement that involves interpretation are not perjury because people can judge incorrectly without knowing it. Perjury only happens if a person wanted to do it and then actually

malicious prosecution

Legal Definition of malicious prosecution

: the tort of initiating a criminal prosecution or civil suit against another party with malice and without probable cause

also : an action for damages based on this tort brought after termination of the proceedings in favor of the party seeking damages

Malicious Prosecution and Damages

When someone may be liable for malicious prosecution.

In Antonio Diaz v. Davao Light & Power Corp., et al., G.R. No. 160959, April 4, 2007 (Callejo, J), petitioner unilaterally installed a meter to replace another one. There was a notice of disconnection and eventually, the connection was cut. There was a petition for mandatory injunction to restore connection. It was however settled by way of a compromise agreement where the parties agreed to reduce the respondent’s claim and to waive the counterclaim and to install the electric service. There was no agreement to bar the institution of other action. Thereafter, respondent filed criminal cases for theft against the petitioner, hence, a complaint for damages for abuse of right under Article 19, NCC was filed.

Petitioner insisted that the compromise agreement as well as the decision based on it already settled the controversies between them; yet, DLPC instituted the theft case against petitioner, and worse, instituted another action for violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. 876. Thus, the only conclusion that can be inferred from the acts of DLPC is that they were designed to harass, embarrass, prejudice, and ruin him. He further averred that the compromise agreement in civil case completely erased litigious matters that could necessarily arise out of either Electric Meter No. 84737 or 86673509. Moreover, he asserted that the evidence he presented is sufficient to prove the damages he suffered by reason of the malicious institution of the criminal cases. In brushing aside his contentions, the SC

Held: Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The purpose of compromise is to settle the claims of the parties and bar all future disputes and controversies. However, criminal liability is not affected by compromise for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion, though complete reparation should have been made of the damages suffered by the offended party. A criminal case is committed against the People, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the offense. Moreover, a compromise is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinction of criminal liability.

Petitioner is not entitled to damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21, and Article 2217 and 2219(8) of the New Civil Code.

The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercise in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., Limited v. Catalan, G.R. No. 159591, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 498, 511-512; Saber v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132981, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 259). Thus, malice or bad faith is at the core of the above provisions. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. In consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.

There was no malice or bad faith. Petitioner himself alleged in his complaint that he unilaterally installed a meter after it was removed by DLPC. No less than the Court, admonished petitioner and reminded him that connections of electrical service and installations of electric meters should always be upon mutual contract of the parties, and that payments for electrical consumption should also be made promptly whenever due. Based on these established facts, petitioner has not shown that the acts of respondent were done with the sole intent of prejudicing and injuring him.

Petitioner may have suffered damages as a result of the filing of the complaints. However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. (Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Pacilan, Jr., G.R. No. 157314, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 372, 384-385). Whatever damages petitioner may have suffered would have to be borne by him alone since it was his acts which led to the filing of the complaints against him.

Concept of malicious prosecution.

On the other hand, malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by or against who a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. (Yasonña v. De Ramos, 440 SCRA 154 (2004). It is an established rule that in order for malicious prosecution to prosper, the following requisites must be proven by petitioner: (1) the fact of prosecution and the further fact that the defendant (respondent) was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is, by improper or sinister motive. The foregoing are necessary to preserve a person’s right to litigate which may be emasculated by the undue filing of malicious prosecution cases. From the foregoing requirements, it can be inferred that malice and want of probable cause must both be clearly established to justify an award of damages based on malicious prosecution. (Id. At 158-159; Villanueva v. UCPB, G.R. No. 138291, March 7, 2000, 327 SCRA 391, 400; Ponce v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 79184, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 377, 388).

A claim for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three elements aforecited are shown to exist. In this case, the cases were dismissed by the prosecutor before they could be filed in court, hence, they did not end in acquittal.

It cannot be likewise concluded that respondent DLPC acted without probable cause when it instituted the actions. The events which led to the filing of the complaints are undisputed, and respondent DLPC cannot be faulted for filing them. In the early case of Buchanan v. Esteban, 32 Phil. 363 (1915) it was stressed that “one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause.” As Justice Moreland explained in that case:

Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. And the reason for the rule as stated by Blackstone, is that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice is prosecutors, who had a tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictments miscarried.

Thus, the element of malice and the absence of probable cause must be proved. (China Banking Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 94182, March 28, 1994, 231 SCRA 472, 478; Albenson Enterprise Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16, 29). There must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false and baseless to entitle the victims to damages. The two elements must simultaneously exist; otherwise, the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. (Lucas v. Royo, G.R. No. 136185, October 30, 2000; 344 SCRA 481). In the instant case, it is evidence that respondent DLPC was not motivated by malicious intent or by a sinister design to unduly harass petitioner, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect its rights. Respondent DLPC cannot therefore be faulted in availing of the remedies provided for by the law.

In a free society, controversies are heard and settled under the rule of law in the forum of the courts of justice. It is one of the virtues of our system of government that a person who feels aggrieved does not have to take the law into his or her hands or resort to the use of force for the vindication of injury. The courts are there to hear and act on the complaint. The right to litigate is an escape valve to relieve the pressures of personal disagreements that might otherwise explode in physical confrontation. It is necessary not only for upholding one’s claims when they are unjustly denied but also for the maintenance of peace, if not goodwill, among incipient antagonists. Without the right to litigate, conflicting claims cannot be examined and resolved in accordance with one of the primary purposes of government, which is to provide for a just and orderly society. Hence, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he or she be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. (Rivera v. Roman, G.R. No. 142402, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 276; Saber v, CA, supra., at 290; China Banking Corp. v. CA, supra.).

Moral damages.

The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees was likewise upheld:

“The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante. (Roque v. Tomas, G.R. No. 157632, December 6, 2006). Moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. (PNR v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006). The amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.

Evidence of moral damages.

Stephen Huang the victim and his parents Richard and Carmen Huang testified to the intense suffering they continue to experience as a result of the accident. Stephen recounted the nightmares and traumas he suffers almost every night when he relives the accident. He also gets depression when he thinks of his bleak future. He feels frustration and embarrassment in needing to be helped with almost everything and in his inability to do simple things he used to do. Similarly, respondent spouses and the rest of the family undergo their own private suffering. They live with the day-to-day uncertainty of respondent Stephen Huang’s condition. They know that the chance of full recovery is nil. Moreover, respondent Stephen Huang’s paralysis has made him prone to many other illnesses. His family, especially respondent spouses, have to make themselves available for Stephen twenty-four hours a day. They have patterned their daily life around taking care of him, ministering to his daily needs, altering the lifestyle to which they had been accustomed.

Exemplary damages.

On the matter of exemplary damages, Art. 2231 of the Civil Code provides that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. At the time of the accident, the employee was driving without a license because he was previously ticketed for reckless driving. The evidence also showed that he failed to step on his brakes immediately after the impact. Had he done so, the injuries which the victim sustained could have been greatly reduced. Wanton acts such as that committed by the employer need be suppressed; and employers like Mercury Drug should be more circumspect in the observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The award of exemplary damages is therefore justified.

Grave Coercion Under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) the crime of Grave Coercion in imposed upon any person who, without any authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats, or intimidation, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be ...Dec 4, 2009

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7890

AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLE 286, SECTION THREE, CHAPTER TWO, TITLE NINE OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

Section 1. Article 286, Sec. Three, Chapter Two, Title Nine of Act No. 3815, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"Art. 286. Grave Coercion. — The penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding Six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without any authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.

"If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage, or for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act, to prevent him from exercising such right or from so doing such act, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed."

Sec. 2. Sec. 261, Paragraphs (d)(1) and (2), Article XXII of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby repealed.

Sec. 3. All other election laws, degrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

Sec. 4. If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act, or any portion thereof, the application of such section, provision or portion to any person, group or circumstance is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act or application of such section, provision or portion thereof to other persons, groups or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.

Sec. 5.This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Grave threats. — Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer: ... If the threat made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................Grave threats. — Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer: 1.Mar 4, 2009 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................G.R. No. 171511 March 4, 2009

RONNIE CALUAG, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated December 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707 and its Resolution2 dated February 15, 2006, denying reconsideration. The appellate court had affirmed the Decision3 dated August 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 198, in Criminal Case No. 04-0183-84, which affirmed the Joint Decision4 dated January 28, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 79, in Criminal Cases Nos. 47358 and 47381 finding petitioner Ronnie Caluag and Jesus Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries and Ronnie Caluag guilty of grave threats.

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:

On May 18 and 23, 2000, two separate Informations5 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 47381 and 47358, respectively, were filed against Caluag and Sentillas. The Information in Criminal Case No. 47381 charged Caluag and Sentillas with slight physical injuries committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of March, 2000, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person of NESTOR PURCEL DENIDO, by then and there mauling him, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which required medical attendance for less than nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

The Information in Criminal Case No. 47358 charged Caluag with grave threats committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of March 2000, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by personal resentment which he entertained against one JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten said JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO with the infliction on her person of a harm amounting to a crime, by then and there poking his gun at her forehead and uttering the following words in tagalog, to wit:

"Saan ka pupunta gusto mo ito?"

thereby causing said complainant to be threatened.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Upon arraignment, Caluag and Sentillas pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, joint trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the two private complainants, the spouses Nestor and Julia Denido, as witnesses. Their version of the facts are as follows:

In the afternoon of March 19, 2000, around 4 o’clock8 in the afternoon, Nestor learned that two of his guests from an earlier drinking spree were mauled. At that time, Caluag and Sentillas were drinking at the store owned by the son of Sentillas. When Nestor inquired from several people including his own son Raymond what happened, Caluag butted in and replied, "Bakit kasama ka ba roon?," and immediately boxed him without warning. Nestor retaliated but he was overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia saw Caluag and Sentillas box her husband. Although she tried to pacify them, they did not listen to her. To avoid his assailants, Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. At around 6:00 p.m., Nestor told his wife to report the boxing incident to the barangay authorities.9

Later, at around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia and her son Rotsen were on their way to their barangay hall, she encountered Caluag, who blocked her way at the alley near her house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun, poked it at her forehead, and said "Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?"10 Despite this fearful encounter, she was still able to proceed to the barangay hall where she reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay authorities.11

For its part, the defense presented the accused Caluag and Sentillas; and the barbecue vendor Pablo Barrameda, Jr. as witnesses. According to them, in the afternoon of March 19, 2000 at around 6 o’clock in the evening, Caluag was on his way home with his three-year old son when Nestor, drunk and unruly, blocked his way and asked him, "Pare, galit ka ba sa akin?" He answered in the negative but Nestor persisted in his questioning and would not allow him to pass through. Annoyed, he told Nestor, "Hindi nga! Ang kulit kulit mo!" Nestor then boxed him on his face which caused him to fall down. Caluag first assured himself of the safety of his son and then punched Nestor back. As people around pacified them, he was led to the store owned by the son of Sentillas. Nestor pursued him and punched him again. As he retaliated, some bystanders separated them. Nestor then shouted, "Putang ina mo, Pare! Gago ka! Gago ka! Marami ka ng taong niloko!" Thereafter, an unidentified man from the crowd armed with a knife went towards Nestor but Sentillas timely interceded and pacified the man. Sentillas never boxed Nestor. Caluag also denied poking a gun at Julia.12

In a Joint Decision dated January 28, 2004, the MeTC found Caluag and Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries, and Caluag guilty of grave threats.

The MeTC relied on Nestor’s testimony. It noted that Nestor did not deny that he was drunk at the time of the incident while Caluag admitted that he got annoyed by Nestor’s attitude. The MeTC concluded that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their tempers due to Nestor’s unruly behavior. On the other hand, the MeTC noted that Julia did not waste time reporting the gun-poking incident to the barangay. While she had intended to report the mauling of her husband, as he instructed her, what she reported instead was what happened to her. With such straightforward and seemingly natural course of events, the MeTC was convinced that the negative assertions of Caluag and Sentillas cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia.

The decretal portion of the joint decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds and declares accused RONNIE CALUAG AND JESUS S[E]NTILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Slight Physical Injuries under Criminal Case No. 47381, and sentences them to pay [a] fine of ₱200.00 each. The two (2) accused are also censured to be more complaisant and well-bred in dealing with people.

The Court also finds accused RONNIE CALUAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Grave Threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, under Criminal Case No. 47358, and sentences him to suffer two (2) months imprisonment [and to] pay [a] fine of ₱200.00.

Criminal Case No. 47382, as earlier explained, is ordered dismissed being merely a duplication of Criminal Case No. 47358.

SO ORDERED.13

Caluag and Sentillas appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the joint decision of the MeTC.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC on December 9, 2005. The appellate court noted that the MeTC gave credence to the testimonies of Nestor and Julia because they were in accord with the natural course of things. Likewise, petitioner’s negative assertions cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia. The appellate court disregarded the purported inconsistencies in the testimonies of Nestor and Julia since these refer to collateral matters and not to the essential details of the incident.1avvphi1

Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to this Court on the ground that the Court of Appeals:

… MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION;

II.

… ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE [MeTC] WHICH MADE INFERENCES OR CONCLUSIONS IN ITS JOINT DECISION THAT ARE MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE AND WHICH ARE GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES OR CONJECTURES OR ARE BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS;

III.

… ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER HEREIN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.14

Simply, the issue is: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain petitioner’s conviction of slight physical injuries and of grave threats?

Petitioner contends that he was able to present Barrameda, an independent and impartial witness, who supported his version of events and debunked those of Nestor and Julia. Contrary to the findings of the lower courts that petitioner offered mere denials, Barrameda’s testimony is actually a positive statement that should have been given full credit. Petitioner also argues that although the lower courts acknowledged that Nestor was drunk and troublesome at the time of the incident, they chose to believe his testimony rather than petitioner’s. Petitioner adds that there is no basis for the lower courts to conclude that he lost his temper because of Nestor’s unruly behavior. Petitioner maintains that just because Julia immediately reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay, this did not necessarily mean that it actually happened. Petitioner also argues that assuming that he did poke a gun at Julia, the crime committed was other light threats as defined under Article 285, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.15

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the MeTC did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of Nestor and Julia. The MeTC found that the positive assertions of Nestor and Julia, their straightforward manner of testifying, and the seemingly natural course of events, constituted the more plausible and credible version. The MeTC also noted that Julia did not waste time reporting the gun-poking incident to the barangay authorities immediately after it happened. The OSG also agrees with the MeTC that petitioner lost his temper, given the unruly behavior of Nestor.

We find the petition with insufficient merit and accordingly sustain petitioner’s conviction.

At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner raises questions of fact. Certainly, such matters mainly require a calibration of the evidence or a determination of the credibility of the witnesses presented by the parties and the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.16

The well-entrenched rule is that only errors of law and not of fact are reviewable by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 under which this petition is filed. It is not the Court’s function under Rule 45 to review, examine and evaluate or weigh once again the probative value of the evidence presented.17

Moreover, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court. It is not the function of this Court to weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the Court of Appeals for these are deemed final and conclusive and may no longer be reviewed on appeal.18

A departure from the general rule, however, may be warranted where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the evidence on record. Nevertheless, we find that there is no ground to apply the exception in the instant case because the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals are in full accord with those of the MeTC and the RTC. This Court will not assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to the appeal particularly where, as in this case, the findings of the MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals completely coincide.19

Even if the Court relaxes the abovecited general rule and resolves the petition on the merits, we still find no reversible error in the appellate court’s ruling.

As the lower courts and the Court of Appeals correctly stated, the testimonies of Nestor and Julia were more in accord with the natural course of things. There could be no doubt that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their temper as Caluag himself admitted that he got annoyed by Nestor’s unruly behavior. Likewise, the gun-poking incident also happened since Julia did not waste time in reporting it to the barangay authorities. Instead of reporting the mauling of her husband, she reported what happened to her in her hurry, excitement and confusion. Indeed, the positive declarations of Nestor and Julia that petitioner committed the acts complained of undermined his negative assertions. The fact that Barrameda testified in petitioner’s behalf cannot be given more weight than the straightforward and credible statements of Nestor and Julia. Indeed, we find they had no reason to concoct stories to pin down petitioner on any criminal act, hence their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.

The MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals uniformly found petitioner guilty of grave threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer two months of imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱200. We find no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of the MeTC and RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Under the Revised Penal Code, there are three kinds of threats: grave threats (Article 282), light threats (Article 283) and other light threats (Article 285). These provisions state:

Art. 282. Grave threats. — Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:

1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.

If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.

2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat shall not have been made subject to a condition.

Art. 283. Light threats. — Any threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime, made in the manner expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall be punished by arresto mayor.

Art. 285. Other light threats. — The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense.

2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some harm not constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts show that he did not persist in the idea involved in his threat, provided that the circumstances of the offense shall not bring it within the provisions of Article 282 of this Code.

3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not constituting a felony.

In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no condition.

The records show that at around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left her house to go to the barangay hall to report the mauling of her husband which she witnessed earlier at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. On her way there, petitioner confronted her and pointed a gun to her forehead, while at the same time saying "Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?"20 Considering what transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia’s husband, petitioner’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her person. Actions speak louder than words. Taken in the context of the surrounding circumstances, the uttered words do not go against the threat to kill or to inflict serious injury evinced by petitioner’s accompanying act.

Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone amounts to a crime, and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a condition.

Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it specifically states, "shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel", since it presupposes that the threat to commit a wrong will not constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a wrong will constitute or not constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor between grave threats on one hand, and light and other light threats on the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The Decision dated December 9, 2005 and the Resolution dated February 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

"Harassment" refers to a broad number of behaviors that are subject to both criminal punishment and civil liability. On the criminal side, states have a wide variety of criminal laws forbidding harassment in many forms, including general harassment crimes as well as specific forms of harassment, such as stalking and cyberstalking.

Criminal Harassment versus Civil Harassment

Criminal harassment should not be confused with how "harassment" is often used in contexts such as workplace discrimination lawsuits. Federal and state laws ban discrimination against certain types of people in certain situations, such as at work or in housing decisions. In these non-criminal contexts, the victim can sue the harasser in a private civil lawsuit, alleging that the harassment constitutes discrimination.

On the other hand, criminal harassment is usually confined to state law. States vary in how they define criminal harassment. Generally, criminal harassment entails intentionally targeting someone else with behavior that is meant to alarm, annoy, torment or terrorize them. Not all petty annoyances constitute harassment. Instead, most state laws require that the behavior cause a credible threat to the person's safety or their family's safety.

Though state harassment laws vary, they often take different levels and methods of harassment into account. Separate penal statutes or a general harassment statute may list various ways to communicate harassment, including telephone calls, emails, and other forms of communication. Whether there was any legitimate reason for the communication becomes a factor under many states' harassment laws.

Harassment charges can range from misdemeanor to high level felony charges. In many states, people charged with harassment will receive a higher level charge if they have previously been convicted of harassment, of communicating a threat, or of a domestic violence offense. Harassment by someone in violation of a restraining order may also draw a higher level charge. Some states elevate the charge if the harassment targeted someone based on race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation.

Stalking and Menacing

In some states, "stalking" is specified as a separate offense from harassment. Other states include both harassment and stalking under a single general statute. Stalking generally refers to a clear pattern of conduct through which the perpetrator causes the victim reasonable fear for their safety or their family's safety. Interstate stalking is a federal crime

Some states punish stalking as a form of "menacing." Menacing can often include ongoing actions, such as stalking someone, which cause reasonable fear in the victim. Menacing also often includes single acts which are purposefully intended to create a reasonable fear in someone, such as brandishing a weapon.

Whether and how states draw lines between harassment, menacing and stalking varies greatly. For more specifics, see state stalking laws.

Cyberstalking

Some states have enacted specific laws against stalking someone online. "Cyberstalking" generally refers to stalking someone through the internet, email, text messages, or other means of electronic communication. Many states have revised their harassment and/or stalking laws to explicitly include harassing electronic communications. Some states also punish actions akin to cyberstalking under laws aimed at improper uses of computers or electronic communications networks.

Federal law makes it a crime to "transmit in interstate commerce" (which includes the internet) a communication containing a threat to kidnap or physically harm someone.

Harassment and Restraining Orders

While prosecutors can charge someone with criminal harassment, victims of abuse or harassment may also petition the court for an order of protection or restraining order to prohibit someone from engaging in harassing behaviors.

Orders against harassment and restraining orders frequently come into play in situations involving domestic violence.

Such orders come from civil courts, but violation of these court orders may constitute a separate criminal offense and/or contempt of the civil court. Violating a protective order may also increase the severity of a harassment, stalking or menacing charge.

Conclusion

Harassment refers to a wide variety of behavior which can violate both civil and criminal laws. What constitutes criminal harassment varies by state, but it generally entails targeting someone else with behavior meant to alarm, annoy, torment or terrorize, and creating reasonable fear in the victim for their safety or the safety of their family.

Talk to a Criminal Defense Lawyer About Your Harassment Charges

On occasion, people may allege criminal harassment as a way to get back at someone else. If you're on the receiving end of allegations of criminal harassment, a criminal defense lawyer can help you navigate the court system and ensure that your rights are protected. Thankfully, there are experienced criminal defense lawyers in your area who can craft a defense and give you some peace of mind.

No criminal case if filed with wrong court – SC

292

WRONG COURT JURISDICTION

Published February 18, 2019, 3:07 PM

By Rey Panaligan

In the prosecution of a criminal offense as a result of a failed business transaction, the place where the transaction was consummated with finality – like signing of an agreement and issuance of check payment – determines which trial court has jurisdiction, the Supreme Court (SC) said in a recent decision.

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“Indeed, it is rather unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue,” the SC stressed in a decision written by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta.

With the ruling, the SC dismissed the petition of Ruel Francis M. Cabral and dismissed, without prejudice, the criminal case for estafa filed against Chris S. Bracamonte.

Case records showed that on Sept. 15, 2009, Cabral and Bracamonte executed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) in Makati City for the purchase of shares of stock in Wellcross Freight Corporation (WFC) and Aviver International Corporation (AVIVER).

Simultaneous with the signing of the MOA, Bracamonte issued to Cabral a postdated check for P12,677,950.15. When the check was presented for payment in a bank in Makati City, the bank dishonored it for lack of sufficient funds.

When Bracamonte failed to settle the obligation, Cabral filed an estafa case against him in Paranaque City. Bracamonte sought the dismissal of the case stressing that the venue was improperly laid as he pointed out that the check was delivered and dishonored in Makati City.

The Paranaque RTC denied Bracamonte’s motion. It ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case because Bracamonte employed fraudulent acts against Cabral during their meeting in the old warehouse of WFC and AVIVER located in Parañaque City, as alleged in the complaint.

The trial court further ruled that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information (criminal charge sheet). It added that since the complaint-affidavit and the information duly alleged that Bracamonte deceived Cabral in Parañaque City, the Parañaque RTC appropriately had jurisdiction over the case.

Bracamonte elevated the issue before the Court of Appeals (CA) which, on March 27, 2017, ruled in his favor. Cabral filed a petition with the SC which sustained the CA’s ruling.

The SC rejected Cabral’s claim that since the business transactions with regard to the terms and conditions of the MOA between him and Bracamonte were transacted in a warehouse in Parañaque City, the element of deceit definitely occurred in Paranaque City.

“Apart from the allegation, however, [Cabral] did not present any evidence, testimonial or documentary that would support or corroborate the assertion. Equally guilty of the same failure to substantiate is the trial court which relied merely on Cabral’s complaint affidavit in connecting the alleged offense within its territorial jurisdiction,” the SC said.

It also said:

“Not only were the MOA and subject check executed, delivered, and dishonored in Makati City, it was even expressly stipulated in their agreement that the parties chose Makati City as a venue for any action arising from the MOA because that was where it was executed.

“It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the element of deceit took place in Makati City where the worthless check was issued and delivered, while the damage was inflicted also in Makati City where the check was dishonored by the drawee bank.”

The dismissal of the criminal case, without prejudice, against Bracamonte means that Cabral can refile the complaint before the Makati City RT

What is “Obstruction of Justice”?

The term is used to refer to the acts punished under Presidential Decree No. 1829 (“Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders”). Full text here.

What is the stated purpose of PD 1829?

As stated in the law, its purpose is to discourage public indifference or apathy towards the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, it is necessary to penalize acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.

What is the penalty for “Obstruction of Justice”?

The penalty is imprisonment, fine or both. Imprisonment ranges from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years (prision correccional in its maximum period). The fine ranges from P1,000 – P6,000.

Who may be charged under PD 1829?

Any person — whether private or public — who commits the acts enumerated below may be charged with violating PD 1829. In case a public officer is found guilty, he shall also suffer perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

What are the acts punishable under this law?

The law covers the following acts of any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases:

a. Preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats. b. Altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases. c. Harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction. d. Publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes. e. Delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscals’ offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts. f. Making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases. g. Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discontinuing, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal offender. h. Threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in criminal cases. i. Giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or the court.

What are some of the instances when questions against charges under PD 1829 reached the Supreme Court?

In Posadas vs. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 131492, 29 September 2000), certain officials of the University of the Philippines (UP) were charged for violating PD 1829 (paragraph c above). The UP officers objected to the warrantless arrest of certain students by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). According to the Supreme Court, the police had no ground for the warrantless arrest. The UP Officers, therefore, had a right to prevent the arrest of the students at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal. The “need to enforce the law cannot be justified by sacrificing constitutional rights.”

In another case, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile was charged under PD 1829, for allegedly accommodating Col. Gregorio Honasan by giving him food and comfort on 1 December 1989 in his house. “Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended.” The Supreme Court ruled that Sen. Enrile could not be separately charged under PD 1829, as this is absorbed in the charge of rebellion already filed against Sen. Enrile.

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